附录二：外文原文
Liability and Limitation of Liability
Introduction
This chapter examines the issues of shipowner rights to limit liability. It does not address the conventions relating to ship-source pollution damage since these have been dealt with in the previous chapter. Conventions have been developed, particularly over the last 40 years, through IMO to be applied on an international basis. This means that the same underlying principles will be applied in all contracting states. It is a matter of regret that with the exception of the oil spill compensation conventions, which have been widely ratified (but not by the USA), other IMO liability and limitation conventions have received more limited acceptance. This, in turn, has encouraged some states and regions to take, or attempt to implement, unilateral solutions as in the case of the U.S. Oil Pollution Act referred to in the last chapter. This undermines global uniformity and creates inefficiencies resulting from differing liability and insurance requirements.
As discussed in relative detail in the previous chapter, the distinction between compensation as a civil remedy and punishment as a penal sanction must be readily appreciated. Compensation responds to liability which must be proved if based on negligence or arises because the incident, regardless of the cause or fault, is subject to strict liability such as in the case of pollution damage. The purpose is to reimburse affected parties for loss or damage which they have suffered. It is not intended to be punitive. The majority of incidents result from the natural dangers of the sea, misfortune or snap judgements in the face of difficulties where the clear view of hindsight might have suggested a different course of action. Any question of criminality or irresponsible behaviour must be dealt with in accordance with other legislative mechanisms. It is unfortunate that regulators in some areas have lost sight of this fundamental separation. As a result, their view that compensation should be used as a financial weapon to control and improve shipowner behaviour does not stand up to scrutiny.
The principle of shipowner rights to limit liability is often viewed negatively because of an inadequate appreciation of the workings of the shipping industry. Limitation is based on the need to predict liability exposure and purchase insurance to cover the risks which may give rise to such liabilities. As such, there is a defined reference point, regardless of fluctuating vessel values and nature of the risk. This facilitates trade by providing finite values in the event of an incident; represents a quid pro quo for high compensation levels; and encourages the settlement of claims by reducing the scope for disputes on liability and the quantum of damages. In contrast, unlimited liabilities are uninsurable and in practice would be capped to the extent of available cover; thereafter, shipownersrsquo; assets would be taken into account bringing us back to the flawed notion of punishment, this time through the spectre of financial ruin.
The Hamburg Rules
The Hamburg Rules came about as a result of pressure during the 1970s for a new regime advocated, in particular, by developing countries whose representatives uestioned the basis of earlier international provisions and their suitability in terms of the needs of developing conomies. The Rules, which were adopted in 1978, have never been widely accepted with few major trading nations having ratified them. Even so, the Convention is in force.
As with the Hague and Hague–Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules are not applicable to charterparties. However, the scope of application has been widened to extend carrier liability from the time the carrier takes charge of the goods at the port of loading until the goods have been handed over to the consignee or otherwise delivered on his behalf.
While carrier liability is, again, fault-based, the test is altogether more subjective. The carrier is liable for loss or damage unless he proves that “he, his servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences”. The general lack of clarity resulted in the need for an accompanying Common Understanding at the Conference that carrier liability is “based on the principle of fault or neglect” and that, as a rule, the burden of proof rests with the carrier unless otherwise modified by the provisions of the Convention. Limitation was established at SDR 835 per package or unit or SDR 2.5 per kg, whichever is the higher.
The Hamburg Rules also introduced, for the first time, prescriptive measures relating to jurisdiction and arbitration. Such provisions were, however, inconsistent with arrangements which have functioned successfully over the years whereby claimants, wherever located, normally expect to receive compensation direct from their insurers leaving any recourse action to be pursued by underwriters through a single jurisdiction, usually in a carrierrsquo;s domicile. This was, perhaps, a significant reason for the failure of the Rules to gain acceptance.
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the InternationalCarriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, 2008 (RotterdamRules)
During the closing years of the last century, concerns began to emerge about the perceived diversity of cargo liability regimes across the world. The position mightnothave been quite as bleak as it appeared on paper but, nevertheless, the differentarrangements set out in this section suggest that the objective of a single internationalregime had been lost. The worldrsquo;s major trading nations were largely usingtheHague–Visby Rules, either as parties or through similar domestic legislation, but the USA remained wedded to its Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936, whichgave continuing effect to the original Hague Rules. While the
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附录一：外文文献的中文翻译
责任与责任限制
引言：
本章节试验的主题是船主责任限制的权力。这不是在说那些与船舶污染的伤害相关的公约，这个问题在前面的章节已经解决了。公约已经完善发展起来了，尤其是过去的40年来，并通过IMO把这些公约应用于国际之间。本章节主要讲的是相同的基本原则将适用于所有的缔约国。令人遗憾的是，除了原油泄漏的赔偿公约被广泛签订以外（除了美国），其他IMO的责任和责任限制公约并没有没全面接受。反过来，这鼓励了一些国家和地区采用，或者尝试去实施单方面的解决方案，正如上一章所提及的美国油污法案的案例。这一举措，破坏了世界的团结性，也造成了由于不同责任条款和保险要求所造成的效率低下。
由前面几章所讨论的相关细节可知，民事救济式的赔偿和刑事制裁式的处罚之间的区别必须是要很容易就能鉴定出的。赔偿对应的是责任，这个责任必须要查证出，是因为过失或者由于某些事件的发生而产生，并且不管发生的原因和谁的过错，均属于严格的赔偿责任，比如在污染损害的案例之中。此举目的是在于对事件中收到损失或伤害的一方进行补偿，并没有惩罚的意图在其中。大多数的事件的发生是由于海洋自然灾害，不幸的事件或者在面对困难时草率的判断，而在事后发现其或许能提示一个不同的行为过程。任何对于犯罪行为或不负责任的行为的疑问必须依照其他的立法机制来解决。不幸的是，某些地区的监管机构忽视了对这两者的最基本的分离。因此，赔偿应当被用作一件财政武器来控制并改善船主行为的这一观点并不经得起推敲。
由于没有充分认识航运业的运作，船主责任限制权的原则经常被消极地看待。责任的限制是基于预测的责任风险和购买保险以避免这些责任可能引发风险的需要。本来这就存在着一个明确的参考点，不因船舶的价值波动或风险的性质而变化。通过在事件中能提供限价，这既能够促进贸易的产生；也能作为高等级赔偿中的一种补偿，同时也鼓励了降低责任的争议范围和减少赔偿损害数额的理赔方式。相反，无限责任是不可保的，在实际案例中也会被限制在一个可覆盖的责任范围里面。随后，船主的资产也将被纳入考虑范围。而这一次只不过是通过金融破产的带来的后遗症使我们重新回到刑罚的概念缺失之中而已。
汉堡规则
汉堡规则的出现是20世纪70年代人们对新政权的主张，尤其是那些发展中国家的代表，他们对早期的国际规定是否使用于发展中国家的经济发展的质疑所造成的压力所带来的。此规定于1978年被采纳，但从未被广泛接受，只有极少数主要贸易大国批准了该规定。尽管如此，此条约目前仍然生效。
如同海牙和海牙维比斯规则一样，汉堡规则并不应用于租船合同之中。然而，该规定的适用范围已被拓宽来延长承运人责任，责任期为从承运人在装货港接管货物到他将货物交到收货人手上或由他人代替交付的那段时间。
然而，承运人责任再次以其过失为基础进行判断，测试将彻底变得更加主观。承运人对货物的损失或损害将负有责任，除非他能证明是“承认人，承运人的工人或该机构已经采取了所有的合理要求的措施来避免该损失或伤害的出现及其带来的后果”。这种泛指的、缺乏清晰度的描述导致其需要在会谈上提出相应的共识，即“基于过失或疏忽的基础上”。而这，作为一项规定，其查证的压力在于承运人身上，除非该规定由公约的规定所修正。责任限制被制定为每件或没单位SDR835，或每公斤SDR2.5，无论哪一个都是比较高的。
汉堡股则在一开始也介绍了其制定的司法管辖权和仲裁权的相关措施。然而，这些条款，和多年以来的成功运作的安排方式不一致，通过这样的安排方式，索赔人通常能够直接从他们的保险公司处获得赔偿，由在承销商在单一管辖权内，不管在何地，通常是承运人的所在地进行任何的追索诉讼。而这，也许是汉堡规则不被接受的主要原因。
联合国关于国际海运货物全部或部分海运合同的公约，2008（鹿特丹规则）
在上个世纪的最后几年中，人们开始关注世界货物责任制度的感知多样性。这一立场或许并不像字面上所说的那样惨淡，但尽管如此，在这一部分所设定的不同的安排方式暗示了单一的国际制度已丧失其客观性。世界主要的贸易大国大部分在采用海牙和海牙维比斯规则，或者采用相似的国内的相关立法，但美国仍旧坚持其1936年的海上货物运输法，这对汉堡规则也造成了持续性的影响。然而美国开始试图改进其立法，在1997年，CMI提出了一个野心勃勃的项目，以及引进一个新的技术，试图协调并升级其责任制度，来辨认其集装箱化的扩张和不断增长的按户送达的货运规模。
在持续数年的详细考虑和起草，在2001年末，CMI的关于成立国际公约的文件被送到联合国国际贸易法委员会，并成立了由联合国国际贸易法委员会成员、观察政府代表团、政府间组织的代表和工业观察员代表团所组成的专家组对此进行讨论。在2002年2007年间，专家组每年会面两次，最后一次会议于2008年年初举行。随后，专家组的建议被接受，联合国国际贸易法委员会于2008年6月对此文件只进行了极少数的更改，并于同年十二月举办的联合国大会上正式作为公约采用。
此条约比起现有的规定更加综合，而且必须更详细。传统的核心问题，比如承运人的责任依旧是其主要特征，但更多新的领域被提及，比如货物运输，托运人的义务和电子商务。
在提纲中，此条约将适用于运输合同，包括不同国家之间的海事运输。双方均能自由采取与传统的港到港运输，特别是运用于大宗交易的一切规定。然而， 按照按户送达的运输方式来促进集装箱运输到内陆地区的需求，可供选择的规定须包括境外海运部门运输前和运输期间。租船合同，包括箱位租用和舱位租用合同将被排除在外，因为他们正处于目前的制度规定之下，但，从强制保险反映出现有的现实，该条约对于新命名的运输单据，如提货单和海运提单，规定持有人和承运人之间的合同安排都将同样适用。因此，目前来说，班轮运输将属于新的公约范畴，而在不定期货船贸易中，他们的规定将不再生效，直到相关文件被递送到第三方。作为一个重要的例外，此规定的强制性和缺乏灵活性导致只有货主的利益需要更多的有利条件来保障。这种例外将班轮业联系起来，在班轮业中，船主和承认人将允许他们根据实际情况制定“批量合同”，这反映了单方面的需求，也允许了基本条款的宽限。由双方决定相关安排在何时何地实施，使得“批量合同”一词不被故意量化。此系统与目前的班轮服务协议和美国贸易中时兴的服务合同更加协调。
随着功能的革新对应的从有纸化和无纸化办公的平等地位的出现，电子商务无疑是一项重要的创新。这使得电子系统能够不受船主要求使用纸质提货单的限制应用于现实之中。
承运人责任长期以来，一直以过错基础为原评判则，如货物的丢失或损害，运输的延迟等。 承运人辩称，如今“无过错推定”仍旧作为重要的例外而存在，而“无过错推定”早已被海运过失规定所排除。这似乎能被验证为是将更大的责任强加到承运人身上。再者，在船舶开航前和开航当时，谨慎处理使船舶适航是承运人的法定义务。而这一义务，将被拓宽至整个航运期间。
承运人责任将与条款中设定的赔偿限额相一致，除非在海事部门监管范围之外，本应在按户送达运输和按照其他国际运输方式，如CMR（1956年Road提出的国际货物运输合同公约）而不采取该方式，因此出现货物的丢失或损坏的时候，将由承运人和船主为这部分的运输共同设立一个单独的合同。举个例子，在欧洲跨国际公路运输出现意外的时候，将在CMR限额之下进行赔偿，而在海运途中或目的地不明确（有时被称为隐藏或隐秘性损伤）或没有国际条款适用于海事部门运输前或运输后的情况下，将根据公约的限额进行赔偿。责任限制权一般行使在承运人有过失，即其违反公约规定的义务的事件之中，包括误送货物。尽管如此，奇怪之处是实际的运输由分包商负责或由货物主人进行监管，如当货物在海上运输期间违反舱面协议，承运人的责任限制权将被否决。责任限制长期以份数/重要的标准为根据，但增加了其数额，分别为每份SRD875和每公斤SDR3。特别的操作方式将相关运用在声称由于延迟送货造成的经济损失的事件之中。
另一处创新之处是在于此公约介绍了船主所承担的义务，包括将货物送至承运人处，此义务适用于装货和运输，信息和文件的制度以及危险品的管理。船主的义务主要是基于过失判断但对文件的表述误差要求非常严厉，文件的表述误差有可能导致船运耽搁或其他行为的产生。同时，对相关危险品的要求也非常严格，因为危险品将很有可能使承运人，船舶本身和第三方卷入意外之中。船主的责任的潜在开放的，没有上限的。文件包含了纸质版和电子版的可兑现和不可兑现文件的使用和编辑。所需信息需列出一张综合的表单和托运人提供的详细信息，承运人均有权修饰两者的信息以保证其准确性。
我们期望该公约能解决不需要通过货物提单解决货物需求的历史遗留问题，但这一期望并没有实现。只有微小的理论上的改善，似乎没有实际上的好处。尽管如此，电子商务的运用应该有助于加速该文献的产生，至少，在某种程度上，缓解文书工作的不及时的问题。
最初，对管辖权和仲裁权的繁重的惯例和规定，这些规定本应是限制了法院对唯一的法律条款的选择的权利，同时赋予索赔人推翻仲裁协议的权利，这些都被修正了。此外更重要的是，这些规定将只适用于在某个积极采用并选择合适的规定的地区。极少数国家希望采取这一措施。
其他规定，具体包括了书面报告，将货物运动到收货人手上，当未收货时承运人的义务，损失或货物损害的通知，索赔人的索赔权和诉讼时效的相关证据方面的规定。
该条约与2009年9月21日在鹿特丹开放签约，因此被命名为鹿特丹规则，共有20个国家签署该规则并生效。到2012年7月，该规定签约国达到24个，包括10个欧洲国家和美国。目前，只有西班牙和多哥仍采用代表他们多年以前的航运成就的公约，以期恢复国际统一和避免通过其他的趋于机制的建设所导致的协调责任条款的破裂。
(译自：P.K. Mukherjee and M. Brownrigg, 国际航运法[J].世界海洋大学海运事务,2013,Vol.1.)
附录二：外文原文
Liability and Limitation of Liability
Introduction
This chapter examines the issues of shipowner rights to limit liability. It does not address the conventions relating to ship-source pollution damage since these have been dealt with in the previous chapter. Conventions have been developed, particularly over the last 40 years, through IMO to be applied on an international basis. This means that the same underlying principles will be applied in all contracting states. It is a matter of regret that with the exception of the oil spill compensation conventions, which have been widely ratified (but not by the USA), other IMO liability and limitation conventions have received more limited acceptance. This, in turn, has encouraged some states and regions to take, or attempt to implement, unilateral solutions as in the case of the U.S. Oil Pollution Act referred to in the last chapter. This undermines global uniformity and creates inefficiencies resulting from differing liability and insurance requirements.
As discussed in relative detail in the previous chapter, the distinction between compensation as a civil remedy and punishment as a penal sanction must be readily appreciated. Compensation responds to liability which must be proved if based on negligence or arises because the incident, regardless of the cause or fault, is subject to strict liability such as in the case of pollution damage. The purpose is to reimburse affected parties for loss or damage which they have suffered. It is not intended to be punitive. The majority of incidents result from the natural dangers of the sea, misfortune or snap judgements in the face of difficulties where th
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